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Montesquieu et le pouvoir de punir
Ramses Delafontaine
1 In L’esprit des droits. Montesquieu et le pouvoir de punir [hereafter ED], the Italian political
philosopher Dario Ippolito reconsiders Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes and L’esprit des lois
[hereafter EL]. The title of Ippolito’s original work in Italian – Lo Spirito Del Garantismo.
Montesquieu e il potere di punier – tells us that the author seeks to determine to what extent
the philosophical foundations of the Italian jurist Luigi Ferrajoli’s theory of ‘garantismo’
can be found with Montesquieu.1 In other words, as Martin Rueff notes in his foreword to
the French edition, Ippolito undertakes a genealogy of Ferrajoli’s ‘garantismo’ for which
he  goes  back  to  Montesquieu  (ED,  p.  XX).  I  will  first  briefly  discuss  Montesquieu’s
thoughts  in  EL  on  criminal  law.  After  which  I  will  turn  to  Ippolito’s  analysis  and
Ferrajoli’s ‘garantismo’.
2 The principle idea,  which Montesquieu set forth in EL, was that those who wield the
power of the state continuously seek to expand this power at the expense of the liberty of
the citizens. This power therefore has to be checked by others in power to avoid the rise
of  despotic  power.  Montesquieu  then  argued  that  the  power  of  the  state  should  be
exercised following a system of checks and balances based on the principle of a division of
powers  between  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  branches  of  government.
Montesquieu  additionally  identified  criminal  law  as  an  important  safeguard  against
excessive use of the state’s power to punish. In EL, he wrote ‘Therefore, the citizen's
liberty depends principally on the goodness of the criminal laws’  (EL,  XII,  ch.  2).  His
insight that criminal law protects and at the same time threatens individual liberties is –
unjustly – the lesser-known half of what Judith Shklar called Montesquieu’s liberalism of
fear.2
3 We can probably retrace Montesquieu’s concern with criminal  law to his career as a
magistrate in the criminal chamber of the Parlement de Bordeaux from 1714 to 1726 . As
president of the Parlement, a position which he occupied from 1716 onwards, Montesquieu
could not have avoided overseeing criminal inquiries, including interrogations that relied
on torture,  as well  as punishments such as the assignment of  the condemned to the
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galleys and the carrying out of capital punishments.3 To his credit, these experiences with
the criminal justice system of the Ancien Régime drove Montesquieu’s thinking towards
more enlightened ideas on criminal law.
4 Humanizing punishments was a popular subject among thinkers of the Enlightenment,
especially  those  writing  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  upon who
Montesquieu’s works had an influence. In his Dei delitte e delle penne, Cesare Beccaria, to
give one example, reverently called Montesquieu ‘the immortal president’.4 His influence
is surprising when we realize that Montesquieu did not set out a systematic theory on
criminal law in EL. Rather, he returned to the subject on several instances in all of his
works, especially in book VI of EL. 
5 Much of Montesquieu’s elaborations on criminal law are derived from the idea that all
laws which criminalize acts that are not truly criminal are corrupt and diminish the
liberty  of  the  citizens.  He  therefore  argued  against  criminalizing  thoughts,  religious
offences,  acts  of  lèse-majesté,  and  suicide.  He  furthermore  looked  favorably  upon
humanizing penal law and instituting proportional penalties founded in law. The quality
and  clarity  of  the  language  of  criminal  laws  as  well  as  the  active  and  consequent
application of criminal laws through conscious deliberation in the light of the specific
facts of different cases by judges, who should respect nullities, the rights of the defense,
and criminal  procedural  formalities;  were all  essential  conditions for Montesquieu in
order for criminal law to protect citizens from unjust accusations by corrupt prosecutors
and undeserved punishments by arbitrary judges.
6 In nine topical chapters, which mostly consider a specific crime Montesquieu sought to
decriminalize,  Ippolito  makes  a  detailed  and  well-founded  analysis  of  Montesquieu’s
concerns over criminal law. The merit of Ippolito’s analysis is apparent on three levels.
The first is bringing the work of Ferrajoli to the attention of French-speaking readers.
The second is the amount of literature that Ippolito brings to bear on his reflections. The
third is his conviction to interpret Montesquieu on his own terms, that is within the
historical intellectual context in which Montesquieu was writing. However, one does not
see Ippolito breaking much new ground. For example, in the second chapter – which
constitutes the most in depth analysis of the book – Ippolito questions what Montesquieu
meant by ‘la nature des choses’ as a normative imperative (ED, p. 27-44). Ippolito arrives at
an argument which was already formulated by Louis Althusser in 1959 when he put forth
that when Montesquieu wrote about ‘the natural state of affairs’ as a normative principle
he meant that laws should confirm and enable the common reports among men specific
to their geographical, temporal, and cultural contexts (in contrast to creating laws based
on natural, categorical, Kantian absolutes).5 
7 Luigi Ferrajoli’s concern for protecting civil liberties from excessive criminal prosecution
was similarly the result of hands-on experience as an Italian magistrate in the sixties and
seventies. Ferrajoli is a legal philosopher whose work is well known to Italian, Spanish,
and Latin American jurists.6 In his work Diritto e ragione: Teoria del garantismo penale [Law
and Reason: Theory of Criminal Guaranties] Ferrajoli sets out a theory of legal positivism
in which criminal guaranties form essential protections for individual liberties.7 Ferrajoli
theorized that there were two categories of guaranties: primary and secondary. Primary
guaranties are rights as well as material and procedural laws. While secondary guaranties
are  the  duties  to  act  (especially  of  judges)  when the  primary  guaranties  have  been
transgressed or ignored.
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8 It is perhaps not surprising that such a theory which regards the formal guaranties of the
criminal justice system as essential for safeguarding personal liberties developed in post-
war Italy where one can find more than one relatively recent criminal  case brought
against – alleged – terrorists in which the judiciary, in close collaboration with elements
of the executive, failed to protect the essential rights of the accused and produced, what
the Italian micro-historian Carlo Ginzburg has called, ‘a miscarriage of justice’.8
9 Today, not only Italians need to worry about the delicate balance between the protection
which criminal laws provide and the danger they pose at the same time. For as Italian
governments and courts have answered the threat of terrorism, in part, by occasionally
diminishing the protections and safeguards of  prosecuted citizens,  so too have other
governments in Europe – and across the globe – reacted to the most recent wave of
Islamic (both international  and domestic)  terrorism by diminishing those safeguards.
Whether as in France through an across the board reduction by instituting a ‘state-of-
emergency’  whose  emergency  character  was  no  longer  characterized  by  brevity  [in
France the ‘state-of-emergency’ started on November 13, 2015 (the day several terrorist
attacks in Paris killed 130 people with over 413 people injured) and lasted until November
1st, 2017 (after the French legislature had passed new counter-terrorism legislation on
October 3rd, 2017)].9 Or as in Belgium where the federal government in the wake of the
attacks  in  France  and  Brussels  in  2015  and  2016  reformed  criminal  warranties  one
individual measure at a time.10
10 Apart from the diminishment of classical criminal guaranties in the wake of terrorism
attacks  and  threats,  governments  also  diminish  the  protection  of  criminal  law  by
encroaching upon the privacy of their citizens as state agencies gather increasingly more
information on citizens. I am thinking of the increasingly frequent use of techniques such
as wiretapping, reviewing of social media messages and emails, prevalence of cameras in
the public  sphere,  collection of  financial  information and even biometrical  data,  etc.
Often initially proposed as positive efforts in the public’s interest to identify more rapidly
criminals and circuits of black money, there is a risk that governments are moving to use
these  information streams against  their  citizens  for  less  noble  purposes  such as  the
initiation of unwarranted criminal prosecutions, if that is not indeed already the case. 
11 Though this contemporary relevancy of the guaranties of criminal law was raised in the
introduction by Ippolito (ED, p. 14-15), the author does not consider this further in the
book.  It  is  unfortunate  that  Ippolito  has  not  ventured  to  apply  Montesquieu’s  and
Ferrajoli’s  philosophies to these contemporary challenges.  This in contrast with what
Montesquieu professed were his  own aims when he wrote about establishing a more
scientific form of legal scholarship. For Montesquieu it was clear that to find the true ‘
nature des choses’ it is necessary to look at contemporary social experience. 
12 Montesquieu’s basic premise that state power will seek to curtail citizens’ liberties is a
lesson we do not have the luxury of forgetting. Remembering that Montesquieu made a
clear division between on the one hand how we organize our political institutions (a
constellation  of  checks  and  balances)  and  on  the  other  hand  the  necessary  role  of
criminal  law for  the  protection of  the  liberties  of  citizens  (political  rights,  rights  of
property,  and  civil  liberties),  is  important.  The  work  by  Ippolito,  Ferrajoli,  and
Montesquieu  forcefully  remind  us  that  criminal  laws  deserve  our  attention  and
protection for they shield us from the arbitrary exercise of power and thus safeguard our
liberty.
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